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Summary of Conclusions for
 Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: April 14, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
 on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
 Anthony Lake

OVP
 Leon Fuerth

State
 Strobe Talbott
 Robert Frasure

DOD
 William Perry

OMB
 Gordon Adams

USUN
 Madeleine Albright

Chief of Staff
 No Representative

CIA
 Admiral William Studeman

JCS
 General John Shalikashvili

White House
 Samuel Berger

NSC
 Alexander Vershbow
 Brigadier General Don Kerrick

Summary of Conclusions

Sanctions

1. Principals discussed whether and under what conditions to support extension of limited sanctions relief for the FRY beyond the second 100-day period that ends on April 22. Principals agreed that while the border closure has proven less effective than desired, other variables, including the situation on the ground and views of Allies and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, must be taken into account. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Duration of Sanctions Relief

2. Principals agreed to support a conditioned extension of sanctions relief for less than 100 days, with the exact timeframe to be determined after consultations with the Bosnian Government. Principals agreed that State should seek definitive views from the Bosnian Government (Action: State) and that Ambassador Albright should incorporate those views in negotiations with Allies on the length of additional sanctions relief. (Action: USUN) (S)

Conditions for Sanctions Relief

3. Principals agreed that additional conditions must be included in any new extension of sanctions relief. Those conditions could include, but are not limited to, an end to all cross-border helicopter flights, the termination of telecommunication links between Serbia-Montenegro and Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia, an end to exports from Serbia-Montenegro to Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia under the auspices of the Yugoslav Red Cross and an end to bus transit of Serb soldiers across the border. The U.S. will also pursue measures aimed at closing the "back door," the transshipment of FRY goods through Croatia to Bosnian Serb territory. Principals authorized Ambassador Albright to discuss conditions that should be applied to sanctions relief extension. (Action: USUN) (S)

Tactics

4. Principals discussed the difficulties that will be encountered in crafting an acceptable resolution extending sanctions relief and authorized Ambassador Albright to negotiate with Allies and the Government of Bosnia in the drafting of the resolution. They also agreed that Ambassador Albright should use the threat of a veto in order to ensure the resolution meets U.S. conditions. (S)

Sanctions Tightening Measures

5. Principals deferred discussion of additional sanctions issues and remanded to the Deputies Committee approval of measures to close the "back door" and reduce the transshipment of oil to Serbia-Montenegro through Albania. Principals also asked Deputies to continue efforts to resolve ICFY related funding issues that are hindering ICFY operations. (Action: OVP/State)

Contact Group Status and Prospects

6. Principals reviewed the lack of progress in the Contact Group's latest efforts to gain Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia and the other former Yugoslav Republics in exchange for additional sanctions relief. They agreed that the Contact Group was nearing its useful end as a negotiating body but that we would continue to support the Contact Group plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement, noting that Bosnian Serb continued rejection of the plan remains the primary obstacle to peace. Principals authorized Ambassador Frasure to discuss with the Bosnians the importance of reducing the level of violence in any renewed fighting in order to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

(Action: State) (S)

OPLAN 40104 Approval ProcessOPLAN 40104

7. Principals reviewed the status of OPLAN 40104 that covers NATO participation in UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Bosnia. Noting that unanswered policy questions remain, they directed the IWG to develop a list of unanswered policy questions and answers relating to the plan for Deputies' review before briefing the plan to the President and Congress. (Action: NSC with input from State/OSD/JCS) Principals agreed that Congressional consultations should be completed before voting to approve the plan in the NAC or identifying specific U.S. units that will participate in the operation. (S)

Command and Control

8. Principals reaffirmed that U.S. participation in UNPROFOR withdrawal is possible only if the operation is under full NATO command and control. They agreed that Ambassador Albright should remind the UNSYG of the requirement for NATO command and control. (Action: USUN) Principals further directed that clear guidance be provided to our representatives at NATO concerning the approval process within the USG. (Action: State/JCS) (S)

NATO Prepositioning

9. Principals reviewed the progress of NATO prepositioning efforts, noting that the SACEUR had been given the authority by the North Atlantic Council to deploy the Step Two mini-prepositioning force (80 personnel, including 20 U.S.). Deployment is expected in late April or early May. Principals agreed that because the NATO operation has not begun, the deploying mini-prepositioning forces will be under national command, NATO operational control and UN tactical control. These

command arrangements are similar to those in place for the other U.S. military personnel already serving in Croatia. Principals agreed that concerned Congressional Staff and members should be briefed on these arrangements before the deployment begins.

(Action: JCS) Subsequent decisions will be required before deploying the maxi-prepositioning force to Croatia and regarding the appropriate command and control arrangements at that stage.
(S)

Options for Strengthening UNPROFOR

10. Principals briefly reviewed the progress of ongoing efforts with the British and the French to strengthen UNPROFOR. Noting that Allies remain very reluctant to undertake meaningful strengthening measures, Principals agreed that the CJCS would report on further progress following his meetings with his counterparts during the week of April 24 in Brussels.

(Action: JCS) (S)